Attribution of profits to permanent establishments under UK law – Inbound situations – (UK permanent establishment of a non-resident company) by Kepper, Philipp
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
School of Advanced Study 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philipp Kepper 
 
Attribution of profits to permanent establishments under 
UK law – Inbound situations – (UK permanent 
establishment of a non-resident company) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MA 2011-2012 
Taxation (Law, Administration and Practice) (Tax) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS UNDER UK 
LAW 
 
- INBOUND SITUATIONS - 
(UK PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-RESIDENT COMPANY) 
 
 
 
IALS  
MA IN TAXATION 
F2009 
 
 
(14,984 WORDS) 
 
 
 
 
 1 
I. Introduction 
Economically, it can be very convenient for a company commencing business in another country to 
establish a permanent establishment (PE) there. A PE (be it a fixed place of business or a dependent 
agent) is a useful means for canvassing and intensifying customer proximity without the regulatory 
conditions and costs linked with the implementation and maintenance of subsidiaries. From a tax 
point of view, it is specifically the fact that the PE is only part of a single legal entity and the 
consequential direct inclusion of the (initial) losses of the foreign business in the tax base of the 
company in the resident state (where the credit method is applied)1 that may render a PE more 
favourable than a subsidiary. However, the establishment will usually be subject to tax in the source 
state, which thus has to determine the profits attributable to it. This task has been subject to one of 
the most controversial discussions in international tax law, which was strongly influenced by the 
work of the OECD. 
 
The legal position in the UK on taxing the profits of non-UK resident companies trading there 
through PEs was unclear for a long time. It is submitted that the attribution of profits was basically 
subject to negotiations with the Revenue, a circumstance that made it extremely difficult for foreign 
companies to anticipate their tax burden. However, in 2003, explicit legislative rules on profit 
attribution and the PE concept were introduced in domestic tax law, which were conceived as an 
adoption of the OECD’s thinking and an appeal to the organisation to proceed with the development 
and implementation of its approach.2 Indeed, the OECD’s concept was refined after 2003 and is 
now reflected in the Model Tax Convention(s) and the respective Commentaries (OECD MTC). 
These probably not only mirror the current and prospective international standard as to the 
application of double tax conventions (DTC) based on the OECD Model but also have a major 
influence on the shape of many other (not only OECD) countries’ domestic rules on profit 
attribution.3  
 
This paper endeavours to analyse whether or not the way and the extent to which those rule have 
been implemented in the UK have resulted in a consistent concept of profit attribution. The first part 
of this analysis deals with the application of the domestic provisions on the attribution of profits 
(specifically in comparison to the OECD Model 2008). It focuses on the general rules rather than on 
the specific issues arising in respect to the banking industry. The second part endeavours to outline 
the implications arising if DTCs based on either the 2008 or the new 2010 Model are applicable.   
                                                
1 Under an exemption method neither the losses nor the profits of the PE are included in the tax base of the company. 
However, to the extent the resident country applies an exemption with (negative) progression, PE losses can still 
mitigate the tax burden of the company.  
2 See e.g. Anderson, [2003] ET 427 at 428. 
3 See Baker/Collier, [2006] IFA-GR 21 at 39. 
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II. The Domestic Rules on Attribution of Profits 
1. The Historical Background 
a. Incipient Stages  
The expression “permanent establishment” dates back to the Prussian Trade Regulation Act of 
1845.4 It was implemented in Prussia’s tax law in 1885, under which it evolved to the present sense 
tax concept in 1891. Subsequently, it appeared in the 1927 League of Nations’ Draft for a Model 
Tax Convention, which also laid the foundation for the modern methods on attribution of profits to 
PEs as it pointed out the relevance of accounts showing the PEs income “separately and in proper 
form”.5 A separate entity approach was introduced with the 1933 League of Nations’ Draft,6 which, 
however, also permitted an attribution based on turnover as well as a total profit apportionment in 
the absence of accounts.7 The 1960 OEEC Report and the 1963 OECD Draft took up the PE 
concept as well as the separate entity thinking and established the modern wording of Article 7, 
which remained basically unaltered in all OECD Models until the release of the 2010 version 
(except for minor changes in 1977, the only relevant of which is the inclusion of the words “subject 
to the provisions of paragraph 3” in paragraph 2).8   
 
b. Functionally Separate Entity Approach (FSEA) v Relevant Business Activity Approach 
(RBAA) 
However, the degree of independence arising from the separate entity fiction underlying the 
Model(s) was subject to constant disputes that were rather intensified by the above-mentioned 1977 
changes and the 1994 OECD’s attempt to clarify the interpretation by amending the Commentary. 
While some argued for an unlimited independence (FSEA) including the recognition of internal 
dealings to be valued at arm’s length (i.e. comprising a profit mark-up), others refused such an 
approach by accentuating the want of legal capacity of the PE. Since it is only part of a single entity 
and cannot enter into legally binding contracts with the other parts of that entity, the latter voices 
opined that only (actual) profits of the enterprise arising from transaction with third parties and 
associated enterprises should be apportioned according to predetermined factors.9 This was mainly 
justified by interpreting the phrase “the profits of the enterprise” in Article 7(1) as meaning that the 
actual profits have to be the starting point (and, consequently, the limitation) of the allocation 
process.10  
                                                
4 Kolck, Betriebstättenbegriff, at 9. 
5 See Article 5(4) of the 1927 Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation. 
6 Article 3(1) of the 1933 Draft Convention on the Allocation of Business Income Between States for the Purpose of 
Taxation.  
7 Avery Jones et al., [2006] BIT 220 (241). 
8 Russo, Attribution of Profits, p. 13; Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, p. 45.  
9 Also referred to as the Single Enterprise Approach, see Baker/Collier, [2006] IFA-GR 21 at 30.  
10 Vann, Business Profits, at 162. 
 3 
c. The Approach(es) of the OECD 
Several shades of the mentioned approaches developed.11 The OECD itself did not recommend a 
pure approach in its Commentaries until the 2008 version but applied a mixture that provided for 
the recognition of only certain types of dealings.12 However, it refused the RBAA while promoting 
the FSEA in the “working hypothesis”, which was developed from 1994 onwards and became the 
“Authorized OECD Approach” (AOA); this was completed in 2008 with the publication of the 
“Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments” (including separate parts on 
global trading, banks and insurance companies). The results of the Report that were held to be 
consistent with the former Article 7 (such as the guidance on capital attribution) were introduced in 
the 2008 Commentary, while the AOA as a whole was only implemented by a revised version of 
Article 7 in 2010.13  
 
d. The Impact on Domestic Law 
The degree of independence is equally relevant for the approaches of determining profits 
attributable to PEs under domestic law. However, only with the enactment of Finance Act 2003 did 
the UK implement the term “permanent establishment” accompanied by an explicit (general) rule as 
to the method of attribution.14 Previously, corporation tax, which was introduced 1965, was levied 
on non-resident companies subject to the condition that they carried on a trade in the UK through a 
“branch or agency”,15 which was defined as meaning “any factorship, agency, receivership, branch 
or management”.16 However, UK law did not provide a general rule on how the amount of profit 
attributable to the “branch or agency” had to be determined but only stated that it included  
 
“any trading income arising directly or indirectly through or from the branch or agency, and 
any income from property or rights used by, or held by or for, the branch or agency […]; 
and such chargeable gains accruing on the disposal of assets situated in the United Kingdom 
[…].”17  
 
                                                
11 Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, p. 93 et seqq. 
12 See Harris/Oliver, International Commercial Tax, at 162 et seqq. 
13 See Arnold, [2011] BIT 3. 
14 Already well before, specific rules applied to insurance companies; see Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 148 with references 
to the respective case law. 
15 Introduced in section 50(1) Finance Act 1965; see equally section 11(1) ICTA 1988.  
16 See section 834(1) ICTA 1988. It is argued by HMRC that the term “branch or agency” was basically in accordance 
with the notion of “permanent establishment” as contained in the OECD Model. As the same is opined in respect to the 
domestic PE concept, the Revenue perceives that its explicit introduction was of no substantive (i.e. altering) effect, see 
INTM264040. 
17 See e.g. Section 11(1) ICTA 1988.  
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The problem, however, was identified even well before the enactment of corporation tax in 
Pommery and Greno v Apthorpe, where a French wine merchant sold his products in England 
through an agent. However, Denman J concluded:  
 
“I do not think it is necessary at all at this stage of the case to decide that. That is a matter of 
quantum, a matter for the consideration of persons skilled in dealing with such matters as 
assessing profits of trade.”18  
 
Hence, the issue was regularly solved on a case-by-case basis in negotiations with the Revenue, 
which is why it seldom reached the courts.19 Therefore, it is impossible to identify clearly a single 
approach that was consistently applied to the issue in practice. However, in the course of the 
changes that accompanied the self-assessment system as introduced with the Finance Act 1995, it 
was established that the branch or agency of the non-resident company is to be treated as being “a 
separate and distinct person from the non-resident” for determining their liabilities as 
representatives of the non-resident company,20 which Schwarz interpreted as support for the 
separate enterprise hypothesis.21 The Revenue saw the lack of case law as giving proof of the 
dispensability of an explicit rule stipulating the approach to profit allocation. It issued a statement in 
1995, in which it opined for the arm’s length principle and the application of transfer pricing 
methods in order to assess the non-resident’s liability to tax under domestic law (irrespective of 
whether a treaty exists or not).22 Accordingly, it moved from a position that was perceived as being 
in practice close to the RBAA23 to an approach resembling the one taken by the OECD in the 
Commentary as amended in 1994 (vide supra).24  
 
Explicit rules on profit attribution were implemented by the Finance Act 2003 in Section 11AA and 
Schedule A1 ICTA 1988, which were attended by the introduction of the term “permanent 
establishment”, the domestic notion of which was provided in sections 148 and 152 and Schedule 
26 Finance Act 2003. The implementation had the aim to align domestic law with the OECD’s 
position and was perceived as support for the development of the working hypothesis.25 In the 
course of the Tax Law Rewrite Project, the allocation provisions were moved to Sections 19 – 32 
CTA 2009 while the rules on the PE concept were relocated to Sections 1141 – 1153 CTA 2010. 
                                                
18 Pommery and Greno v Apthorpe [1886] TC 182 at 189 
19 Casley/Dixon, [2002] ITPJ 182 (185). 
20 This rule is now located in section 835E(3) ITA 2007.  
21 Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 143. 
22 Inland Revenue, [1995] 18 Tax Bulletin 234. 
23 Casley/Dixon, [2002] ITPJ 182 (185). 
24 Inland Revenue, [1995] 18 Tax Bulletin 234. 
25 See Clavey/Morgan, 14 [2003] ITR 33 at 34. 
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2. The Liability to Tax of Non-Resident Companies under UK Law 
a. The Charging Provision 
Nowadays, a non-resident company is chargeable to corporation tax only if it carries on a trade in 
the UK through a PE there (see Section 5(2) CTA 2009). If so, it is taxable on all its profits 
attributable to that PE (wherever arising), which fall within Section 19 CTA 2009 (see Section 5(3) 
CTA 2009). To the extent the profits are within the scope of that provision, the non-resident’s 
liability to income tax is precluded by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) CTA 2009. Capital gains accruing to 
the company are not liable to capital gains tax in the hands of that company but to corporation tax 
(see Sections 4 and 19(1)(b) CTA 2009). 
 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, a liability to income tax exists if a non-resident company 
draws profits from UK sources without carrying on a trade in the UK or carries on such trade but 
without having a PE.26 The same holds true if it is trading through a UK PE but derives profits not 
attributable to that PE.27 Generally, the liability to income tax is limited by virtue of Section 815 
ITA 2007 for those cases. However, since this paper focuses on the allocation of profits pursuant to 
Sections 19 et seqq. CTA 2009, the issues arising in regard to income tax are disregarded 
hereinafter.  
 
b. The Relevance of the OECD’s Documents for Interpretation of Domestic Law  
The term “permanent establishment” as well as respective attribution methods are well known in 
international law (vide supra) and reflected in the OECD documents. Therefore, during the 
consultation process for the UK legislation, the Revenue argued that the domestic rules should be 
interpreted in accordance with the Commentary but moved away from that position later on.28 
However, by now HMRC again accentuates in its International Manual that for the requirements of 
a PE as defined in Section 1141 et seqq. CTA 2010 and the separate enterprise principle under 
domestic legislation the OECD Commentary is a useful means of interpretation.29 This is made 
subject to the condition that the Commentary does not “materially vary through periodic updates or 
amendments” from the version being relevant at the time when the domestic provisions were 
enacted.30 However, unlike for transfer pricing (see Section 164 TIOPA 2010), direct reference to 
the OECD documents is not made in the legislation. Therefore, at first glance, it seems not 
necessary to take any account of them.  
 
                                                
26 INTM262020. 
27 Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para. P1.1.1. 
28 See Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para P3.1.9. 
29 See INTM264050 and INTM267040. 
30 INTM264050. 
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However, to the extent the wording of the national rules resembles the wording of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, nothing prevents OECD documents from being consulted just like any other legal 
opinion published in literature. Furthermore, the Commentary receives additional authority from the 
fact that it served as an important basis for drafting the domestic legislation that was issued in order 
to align national taxation with the international standard as reflected by the work of the OECD.31 
Hence, it is persuasive to argue that the opinion expressed in the Commentary has to be taken into 
account in the context of an historical approach to interpretation. Although the status conveyed by 
such indirect reference is much weaker compared to the direct approach as applied to the TPGL (as 
it is likelier to be overruled by systematic or teleological aspects of domestic law), a complete 
disregard of the Commentary would be imprudent (which does not imply at all that one must follow 
it but only that it should be considered). However, this approach carries the discussion on static or 
ambulatory usage known from the treaty context to the level of statutory construction of domestic 
law. With that regard, it should make no difference whether or not the recent Commentary 
“materially varies” from the version that existed when domestic law was enacted. Only the one that 
existed when the Finance Act 2003 was issued can be relevant in the context of historical 
interpretation (this historical aspect did not change (i.e. was not updated) in the course of the 
Rewrite Project since the relocation of the rules to CTA 2009 were not accompanied by any 
material changes). However, subsequent documents can still be of persuasive value like any other 
legal opinions (vide supra). This resembles the approach in a treaty context pursuant to the 
Commerzbank principles (vide infra).32  
 
Although HMRC’s approach does not seem to be exactly the same (from an intellectual point of 
view), since it does not distinguish between the relevance of the Commentary as a means of 
historical interpretation on the one hand and its impact as a legal opinion of only persuasive value 
on the other, it is rather unlikely that material differences will arise in practice. In respect to both 
opinions the position under the 2008 Commentary (which is, for the most part, identical to the 1994 
Commentary) will have a particular impact. Contrarily, taking into account the 2010 Commentary 
on Article 7 OECD MTC is excluded as the latter refers to the new version of Article 7, on which 
the domestic law is not based.   
 
The following paragraphs endeavour to provide an overview of UK law and its application by 
HMRC. Where appropriate, reference is made (in accordance with the above-mentioned principles) 
to the 2008 Commentary in order to explain the domestic concepts.  
                                                
31 See the Government’s Explanatory Notes to Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009 para. 117. 
32 Commerzbank v IRC, [1990] STC 285 at 297 et seq.  
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c. The Preconditions of Section 19(1) CTA 2009 
Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009 on the attribution of profits is only applicable if a non-resident 
company trades in the UK through a PE within the meaning of Section 19(1) CTA 2009.  
 
aa. Non-Resident Company 
“Company” includes bodies corporate but not partnerships.33 A company is non-UK resident when 
neither the place of incorporation (see section 14 CTA 2009) nor the central management and 
control of its business is in the UK (case law rule).34 The issues that can arise with that respect are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
bb. Trading  
As to the requirement of a “trade”, Section 1119 CTA 2010 provides that this includes “any venture 
in the nature of trade”. Similarly, the former Section 832 ICTA 1988 (now repealed) stated that 
“trade includes every trade, manufacture, adventure or concern in the nature of trade”. Both 
definitions are quite broad but supplemented with extensive case law.35 Basically, it is a matter of 
fact whether a transaction amounts to a trade within that perception (or e.g. to an investment). The 
courts have developed non-exhaustive “badges of trade”, summarized, for example, in Marson v 
Morton and Others, the specifics of which are (again) not within the scope of this study.36 
Extensive guidance can be found in HMRC’s Business Income Manual.37 
 
cc. Trading “in” the UK 
The non-resident company must be trading “in” the UK in contrast to trading “with” the UK. The 
traditional criterion for the determination of where a trade is carried on, which was already 
considered as early as 1881 in Erichsen v Last,38 is the place where the contract is concluded. This 
principal evolved in the Champagne Cases. In Grainger & Son v Gough –  where UK agents of a 
French wine merchants received orders from customers in the UK, which were transmitted to the 
French principal who decided at his own discretion whether or not he would execute the orders – 
the court found that no part of the trade was carried on in the UK.39 Contrarily, in Werle v 
Colquhoun the Court of Appeal considered the trade to be carried on here on the grounds that the 
                                                
33 See Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para P1.1.3. 
34 See Simon’s Taxes, para. D4.103; for central management and control see especially De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Ltd v Howe, [1906] AC 455.  
35 See BIM20065. 
36 Marson v Morton and Others [1986] 1 WLR 1343 at 1348. 
37 BIM20201 et seqq. 
38 Erichsen v Last [1881] LR 8 QBD 414. 
39 Grainger & Son v Gough [1986] 3 TC 462.  
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UK agents of a foreign wine merchant accepted orders for the latter on their own account.40 
However, in Greenwood v FL Smidth, Atkin LJ observed that the place of contracting is (although 
important) not the only decisive factor and that it has to be determined where “the operations take 
place from which the profits in substance arise”.41 This was approved by Lord Radcliffe in 
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v Lewellin.42 
 
In respect to the chargeability of non-resident companies to corporation tax, the main criterion for 
trading “in” the UK is the existence of a UK PE (see Section 19(1) CTA 2009). Both domestic PE 
tests require a “business” carried on in the country (vide infra). However, since the expression 
“business” is wider than the concept of “trade”,43 conducting a “business in” the UK does not 
necessarily imply that someone is also “trading in” the UK. Therefore, the above-mentioned criteria 
(e.g. the place where the contracts are concluded) are still relevant.  
 
dd. The Notion of Permanent Establishment 
Section 1141(1) CTA 2010 provides that a non-resident company has a PE in the UK either if 
 
“(a) it has a fixed place of business there through which the business of the company is 
wholly or partly carried on, or 
(b) an agent acting on behalf of the company has and habitually exercises there authority to 
do business on behalf of the company.” 
 
The wording of Section 1141(1) CTA 2010 resembles Article 5(1) OECD MTC. A service PE 
provision as contained in the UN Model (see Article 5(3)(b) UN Model Tax Convention) or in the 
alternative rule provided in Paragraph 42.23 of the OECD Commentary is not enshrined in domestic 
law. 
 
(1) The Fixed Place of Business 
As to the notion of the expressions “company” and “business” vide supra. The expressions “place 
of business”, “fixed” and “through which” are persuasively interpreted in accordance with the 
OECD Commentary and are, therefore, not set out in detail in this paper.44 However, it is to be 
noted that (in accordance with the UK’s observation in the Commentary to Article 5)45 HMRC 
                                                
40 Werle & Co v Colquhoun [1888] LR 20 QBD 753 at 760. 
41 Greenwood v FL Smidth & Co, 3 [1921] KB 583 at 593. 
42 See Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v Lewellin, [1957] 1 WLR 464 at 471. 
43 See American Leaf Blending Co. Sdn. Bhd. v Director-General of Inland Revenue, [1979] A.C. 676 at 684. 
44 INTM266060 et seqq.  
45 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 5 para. 45.5. 
 9 
specifically excludes the mere operation of a server from being treated as a PE (whether or not it is 
geographically fixed and distinctly attributable to the non-resident).46  
 
Section 1141(2) CTA 2010 provides a non-exhaustive list of “fixed place of business” PEs similar 
to that of Article 5(2) OECD MTC. As in the OECD Model until 1977, the “building site and 
construction or installation project” provision is embedded in that list instead of being contained it 
its own paragraph (see Section CTA 2010). Furthermore, it is not made subject to the twelve-month 
duration requirement of Article 5(3) OECD MTC. However, this does not solve the issue of 
whether or not it constitutes its own category of PE or must fulfil the general requirements of a 
“fixed place of business”.47 As (specifically small or medium-sized) building sites and construction 
or installation projects are usually lasting only for a short-term period (not even meeting the six 
months presumption applied to the “fixed place of business” test)48 and are in most cases 
established for carrying out just a single transaction,49 the deletion of the twelve-month condition 
could be interpreted as an extension of the general rule of Section 1141(1) CTA 2010. From that 
point of view, the inclusion of the provision in Section 1141(2) CTA 2010 could “infect” the 
construction of the list as such and provide an argument for not examining the requirements of a 
“fixed place of business” to the extent that one of the subparagraphs of that rule is applicable. 
However, it is more likely that the opposite was intended. Since Section 1141(2) CTA 2010 is 
based on Article 5(2) OECD MTC, for the latter of which it is made clear in the Commentary that 
the requirements of Article 5(1) OECD MTC must be met,50 the same should hold true for domestic 
law. Therefore, a project in the aforementioned sense will only constitute a PE to the extent it is “a 
fixed place of business”, for the interpretation of which the list is only of limited relevance since it 
is “without prejudice to the generality” of that test.  
 
Furthermore, Section 1141(2) CTA 2010 does not only cover extraction (like Article 5(2) OECD 
MTC) but also exploration for natural resources. In accordance with the interpretation above, this 
extension has no material effect.  
 
(2) The Dependent Agent 
The dependent agent provision (Section 1141(1)(b) CTA 2010) is also based on the OECD Model. 
Since, from a common law perspective, an agent can bind his principal whether or not he is 
concluding contracts “in the name of” the latter, the respective phrase of Article 5(5) OECD MTC 
                                                
46 INTM266100. 
47 See in respect to Article 5(3) OECD MTC Bendlinger/Görl/Schon, [2006] Intertax 180. 
48 See INTM266070. 
49 See Görl, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Article 5 para. 56. 
50 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 5 para. 12. 
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was not adopted. However, whilst, under the OECD Model, the person acting on behalf of the 
enterprise must have and habitually exercise “authority to conclude contracts”, the domestic 
provision requires an agent having and habitually exercising “authority to do business on behalf of 
the company”. The latter term seems to cover a much wider range of activities that may suffice for 
constituting a PE than the conclusion of contracts as required by the OECD. Nonetheless, this does 
not at all entail that contracting is not of relevance from the domestic law perspective. On the 
contrary, the authority to create legal obligations binding upon the principal is already a criterion 
within the perception of “trading in” a country as shaped by UK case law (vide supra).51 However, 
this also brings along the “profits in substance” test as set out in Smidth v Greenwood52 and 
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd v Lewellin.53 In total, it leads to a concept, which is not only in 
support of the OECD’s tendency to water down the requirement of “authority to contract” by 
accepting economic considerations (the OECD argues that a person must not necessarily bind the 
principal legally if it negotiated all relevant elements and details of the contract – a thinking that 
was recently rejected in Dell Norway and Zimmer)54 but to an approach that is even wider than this.  
 
Section 1142 CTA 2010 (based on Article 5(6) OECD MTC) provides that independent agents 
acting in the ordinary course of their business are not regarded to constitute a PE. HMRC states that 
the agent is independent if the relationship between him and the principal is “the same as a 
relationship between independent businesses dealing with each other at arms length”.55 The use of 
transfer pricing terminology is rather unhelpful in the present context, specifically as it seems to 
indicate that associated enterprises always come within the scope of the provision. However, 
HMRC makes it clear that the phrase is to be interpreted in accordance with the guidance of the 
OECD Commentary (i.e. by assessing the legal and economic self-reliance of the agent).56 This 
guidance is also declared to be applicable in respect to the issue of whether or not and under which 
conditions subsidiaries can be dependent agents (meaning that the mere dependency under company 
law is to be disregarded). 57 In respect to the “ordinary course of business” requirement, broad 
reference is made to the Commentary as well.58  
 
 
 
                                                
51 Equally Casley/Dixon, [2002] ITPJ 182, at 185. 
52 Smidth v Greenwood [1921] 3 KB 583 at 593.  
53 Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. v Lewellin, [1957] 1 WLR 464 at 471. 
54 Dell Product v Tax East, 14 [2011] 371; Société Zimmer Ltd v Ministe de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
12 [2010] ITLR 739. 
55 INTM264080.  
56 See OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 5 para. 36 et seqq.  
57 INTM264080. 
58 INTM264070. 
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(3) Preparatory or Auxiliary Activities 
For both alternatives (dependent agent and fixed place of business) a PE is not deemed to exist if 
the activities performed are of a mere preparatory or auxiliary character (see section 1143 CTA 
2010). Section 1143(3) CTA 2010 provides a non-exhaustive list of such activities that basically 
corresponds to the one contained in the OECD Model. However, the domestic rule does not provide 
for an equivalent to Article 5(4)(f) OECD MTC, which states that a combination of exempted 
activities is also to be treated as being exempt to the extent that the overall activity is still of 
preparatory or auxiliary character.59 Because of the latter condition in the MTC and the statement in 
Section 1143(2) CTA 2010 that the list is “without prejudice to the generality of the preparatory or 
auxiliary expression” (in conjunction with the lack of an explicit exclusion of the combination 
clause in CTA 2010), domestic law and the OECD Model should nonetheless lead to the same 
result. Thus, the missing reference to combined activities has no material effect.  
 
(4) Associated Companies 
It has already been mentioned above that HMRC submits that subsidiaries do not automatically 
constitute PEs of their parents (although an equivalent to Article 5(7) OECD MTC was not 
implemented in domestic law).60 This accords with Görl’s opinion in Vogel, who persuasively 
argued that Article 5(7) OECD MTC is a redundant provision, considering that subsidiary and 
parent are legally separate companies.61 However, in accordance with the Model, a PE is assumed if 
the subsidiary meets the “fixed place of business” test or acts as a dependent agent (leaving the 
shareholdings out of account).62 
 
(5) Conclusion 
The wording of the UK’s domestic PE concept is largely in accordance with the OECD’s (not least 
because of the principles of interpretation set out above). However, it also carries over the 
inconsistencies of the OECD’s concept to domestic law. Specifically, the meaning of the illustrative 
lists in Sections 1141(2) and 1143(3) CTA 2010 is ambiguous. This is particularly problematic due 
to the fact that (for the purpose of domestic law) the UK made amendments compared to the 
provisions contained in Article 5 OECD MTC. It would have been preferable from the perspective 
of legal certainty to explicitly state the purpose and impact of those rules. If the UK intended to 
extend the notion of “fixed place of business” by including the “exploration for national resources” 
provision, or wanted to exclude a “combination of exempted activities” to be treated as auxiliary or 
                                                
59 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 5 para. 27. 
60 INTM264080. 
61 Görl, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Article 5 para. 174 and 165. 
62 INTM264080. 
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preparatory, it seems (from the author’s point of view) that it failed to achieve those aims. On the 
other hand, the uncertainties and disputes that arose under Article 5(5) OECD MTC in respect to the 
permissibility of economic considerations in interpreting the phrase “authority to conclude 
contracts” were solved unambiguously in favour of the OECD’s opinion by substituting the term 
“contracts” with “business” and connecting the phrase with the “trade in” requirement. It cannot be 
ignored that in individual cases this may lead to results that go even beyond the OECD’s position in 
the Commentary. However, it is a clear statement that basically resolves the controversy currently 
going on internationally, which is why the amendment is to be generally welcomed.  
 
d. Chargeable Income  
To the extent the requirements of Section 19(1) CTA 2009 are met, Section 19(2) CTA 2009 
determines that the non-resident company is chargeable on any of the following profits attributable 
to the PE: 
 
“(a) trading income arising directly or indirectly through or from the establishment 
(b) income from property or rights used by, or held by or for, the establishment, and 
(c) chargeable gains falling within section 10B of TCGA 1992  
(i) as a result of assets being used in or for the purpose of the trade carried on by the 
company through the establishment, or  
(ii) as a result of assets being used or held for the purposes of the establishment or 
being acquired for use by or for the purpose of the establishment” 
 
As to the notion of “trade” in Section 19(2)(a) CTA 2009 see the explanations above. Section 
19(2)(b) CTA 2009 also brings non-trading income within the charge to corporation tax. The rule 
generally covers royalties, interest and dividends as well as income from property (e.g. rent from 
letting PE premises; see the examples in Bramwell).63 However, the non-resident is only liable to 
tax in that respect as well if it is trading in the UK (vide supra). This is also a precondition for the 
chargeability of capital gains stipulated in Section 19(3)(c) CTA 2009 in conjunction with Section 
10B TCGA. 
 
The further requirements of the above-mentioned provisions are closely linked to the general 
approach to attributing profits and are, therefore, discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                                
63 See Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para. 1.1.5. However, dividends are largely exempted by Part 9A CTA 2009, 
see INTM651010. As regards property, it should be noted that usually the non-resident landlord scheme will apply, see 
INTM262040.  
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e. The Separate Enterprise Approach 
Central to the attribution of profits is the “separate enterprise principle” enshrined in Section 21 
CTA 2009, which provides in Paragraph 1 that  
 
“The profits of the non-UK resident company that are attributable to the permanent 
establishment are those that the establishment would have made if it were a distinct and 
separate enterprise which 
(a) engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and 
(b) dealt wholly independently with the non-UK resident company.” 
 
Apparently, the wording of the provision is based on Article 7(2) OECD MTC.64 However, if the 
legislator had left it at that, the position under domestic law would have been equally ambiguous as 
the one under the OECD Model has been (vide supra for the differing interpretations that have 
arisen in respect to Article 7(2) OECD MTC). Therefore, Section 22 CTA 2009 supplements the 
general rule by stating that 
 
“In accordance with the separate enterprise principle, transactions between the permanent 
establishment and any other part of the non-UK resident company are treated as taking place 
on such terms as would have been agreed between parties dealing at arm’s length.” 
 
The term “transaction” is usually used in a legal meaning. As a company cannot “transact” with 
itself in that sence,65 the OECD substituted the term as regards intra-entity relations with the 
expression “dealing”.66 Despite the different wording, the concept is the same: Notional internal 
“transactions” are to be generally recognized for the purpose of profit attribution.  
 
In respect to actual transactions with third parties (i.e. legal entities), the separate enterprise 
hypothesis requires a treatment that feigns that the respective part of the enterprise itself entered 
into the transaction and not the enterprise as such.67 Accordingly, the PE’s profits generally consist 
of the trading income, non-trading income and chargeable gains as defined in Section 19(3) CTA 
2009, which accrue from its internal (notional) transactions with other parts of the company and 
from the company’s (actual) transactions with other (related or unrelated) parties, which can be 
allocated to the PE.  
                                                
64 See Attard/Cussons, in: Reimer, PE, UK, para. 89. 
65 Birla, [2005] BTR 207, 215; Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 145; Hume/Beeton, [2004] 3942 Taxation 401. 
66 OECD, 2008 PE-Report, para. 13. 
67 Niehaves, in: Haase, AStG/DBA, Article 7 para. 161. 
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The following paragraphs illustrate the concept of hypothesizing the separate enterprise and 
calculating its profits under domestic law. They specifically endeavour to evaluate the extent to 
which UK law provides for a consistent and workable application of the separate enterprise 
principle. As the concept is largely based on OECD principles, particular emphasis is given to 
compliance with the OECD Commentary.  
 
aa. Simulating the Separate Enterprise 
The PE must be assumed as a separate enterprise “engaged in the same or similar activities under 
the same and similar conditions” (Section 21(1) CTA 2009).  
 
(1) Functional and Factual Analysis and Identification of Risks  
For the allocation of (actual) transactions to the PE as well as for the recognition and classification 
of internal transactions it is necessary to identify which functions the PE performs, which risks it 
assumes and which assets it (economically) owns.68 Therefore, HMRC refers to its guidance on 
performing a functional and factual analysis in the context of transfer pricing, which complies with 
the OECD’s approach.69  
 
As to the identification of risks, HMRC looks at the functions that give rise to the risk and the place 
from where it is controlled, which is “where the people with the authority to decide to take on the 
risk and with the capability of managing that risk are located”.70 This is essentially in accordance 
with the OECD’s concept of key entrepreneurial risk taking or significant people function although 
this idea was not separately (i.e. statutory) implemented for the PE concept.  
 
While the existing transfer pricing techniques can be applied to the identification of functions and 
risks, some issues that are specific to the PE context cannot be solved by reference to those 
principles, which is why they are covered by the legislation. This particularly concerns the 
attribution of assets, the PE’s credit rating and the allocation of (notional) equity and loan capital. 
 
(2) Attribution of Assets 
There is no common concept of attributing assets to PEs but the allocation depends on the particular 
context in which the issue becomes relevant. The legislation provides some guidance specifically 
where non-trading income and capital gains are concerned (Sections 19(3)(b) and (c) CTA 2009). 
Although these provisions technically relate to the general chargeability of the mentioned categories 
                                                
68 See Senior, [2006] IFA-UK 665 at 673.   
69 INTM267050. 
70 INTM441030 
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of profits, they also stipulate requirements that can essentially be considered as (asset) allocation 
methods.  
 
(a) Non-Trading Income 
As regards non-trading income, the underlying assets (property or rights) are allocated to the PE 
pursuant to Section 19(3)(b) CTA 2009 when they are “used by, or held by or for, the 
establishment”. Under the OECD Model, the respective income is covered by Articles 6, 10, 11, 12 
or 21 OECD MTC, of which the latter provisions refer to Article 7 OECD MTC when the assets are 
“effectively connected” with a PE. Article 6 OECD MTC, on the other hand, uses the situs 
principle, which is, however, not applied in Section 19(3)b CTA 2009. As for intangibles, HMRC 
seems to allocate the whole asset to the PE for the purpose of non-trading income if the above-
mentioned criteria are met (with the result that the full amount of the consequential payments, and 
not only a share of them, is allotted to the PE).71 This is contradictory to the OECD’s assumption 
that it is basically impossible to allocate intangibles to only one part of the company in the context 
of internal royalties, which the UK endorses by an explicit prohibition of deductions for such 
notional payments; vide infra.72 Admittedly, the issue of whether intangibles should be attributed 
partly or completely to specific parts of the enterprise equally arises under the MTC.73 However, a 
more consistent domestic approach would have been welcomed.74 
 
(b) Capital Gains 
With respect to capital gains, the assets must be (physically) situated in the UK (see in this respect 
Sections 275 TCGA 1992 et seqq.) and used “in or for the purpose of the trade carried on by the 
company through the establishment” at or before the time the gain accrued (see Section 10B TCGA 
1992 in conjunction with Section 19(3)(c) CTA 2009). Alternatively, the mentioned provisions 
attribute the asset to the PE if it is situated in the UK and “used or held for the purposes of the 
establishment at or before the time the gain accrued or acquired for use by or for the purposes of the 
permanent establishment”. The relevant article of the OECD MTC (Article 13(2)) only states that 
the property must form “part of the business property”. Domestic and treaty provisions seem to be 
largely in accordance.  
 
                                                
71 See INTM262040. 
72 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7, para. 34. The 2010 Commentary now explicitly states that the “effectively connected” 
test has to be construed in accordance with the PE Report 2010, see (inter alia) OECD-Comm. 2010, Article 12 para. 
21.1. 
73 See as to the allocation for the mentioned treaty articles Nowotny, Betriebstättengewinnermittlung, p. 162 et seqq. 
74 The domestic rule is even more problematic as it is assumed to be a broad extension of the “effectively connected” 
test (see Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para. P3.3.11).  
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Intangibles (if created after 2002) do not fall within Section 19(3)(c) CTA 2009 as their disposal 
does not usually give rise to a chargeable gain but rather to business income.75 To this extent, 
HMRC argues that an asset is (completely) attributable to a PE if it is “used” in the trade carried on 
through the latter.76 This is quite broad and inconsistent with the legislation’s position as to 
royalties (see the explanations as to non-trading income above).   
 
(c) Trading Stock 
As to the attribution of trading stock, no explicit reference is made in the legislation (Section 
19(3)(a) CTA 2009 is of no help in that respect). Section 23 CTA 2009 simply presupposes that an 
allocation is to be conducted. In accordance with the OECD Report, it should be inferred from the 
location of the asset and the structure of the business (specifically taking into account the allocation 
of inventory risks) as revealed by the functional and factual analysis.77  
 
(d) Capital Attribution 
A (rather general) reference to the allocation of assets to the PE is provided in the context of 
drafting the (notional) balance sheet that is required for attributing capital (vide infra). In that 
context, HMRC states that assets are to be allocated to the PE if it derives income through them.78 
Further guidance is not provided. However, as a matter of coherence, the above-mentioned 
principles regarding trading stock and assets used for non-trading income should apply.  
 
(e) Conclusion 
Considered as a whole, the task of attributing assets to the PE under UK domestic law is rather 
complex and not entirely consistent. Senior, too, specifically criticised the fact that the situation 
regarding intangibles appears to be incoherent.79 On the one hand, the UK adopts the opinion that 
internal royalties should not be charged because an allocation of intangibles is considered to be 
practically impossible. On the other hand, HMRC applies an (exclusive) allocation in order to 
directly attribute actual royalties (i.e. royalties charged to third parties) to the PE as well as for 
attributing profits arising from disposals of intangibles (including intra-entity transfers; vide infra) 
and calculating the amount of free capital. Admittedly, this issue is also controversial under OECD 
Model and Commentary (until 2008).   
 
 
                                                
75 CIRD10101 et seqq. 
76 See CIRD10200 on Sections 859(2)(b) and 863 CTA 2009. 
77 See OECD, PE Report 2008, Part I, para. 279. 
78 INTM267130. 
79 See Senior, [2006] IFA-UK 665 at 674. 
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Furthermore, domestic law applies different rules with varying formulations for all above-
mentioned purposes (for tangibles as well as for intangibles). However, despite this inconsistent 
wording, it seems possible to deduce a common directive for allocating assets to the PE. Section 
19(3)(b) CTA 2009 concisely stipulates that assets have to be allotted to the PE when they are “used 
by, or held by or for, the establishment”. Since the wording of Section 19(3)(a) CTA 2009 
(“directly or indirectly through or from the establishment”) is of no particular help (as it basically 
only repeats the directive of Section 21 CTA 2009) and no rules exist in the legislation as regards 
the attribution for the purpose of calculating free capital, it appears persuasive to apply the same 
thinking (“used by, or held by or for“) for all purposes. Furthermore, in the author’s view, the 
wording of Section 19(3)(b) CTA 2009 essentially implies the requirements contained in the 
legislation for capital gains in Section 19(3)(c) CTA 2009, with the exception of the condition that 
the assets must be “situated” in the UK.80 Accordingly, it would have been preferable for the sake 
of clarity to implement the mentioned wording as the general concept for attributing assets under 
UK law in the form of a subparagraph to Section 21(2) CTA 2009 instead of using the current 
concept contained in Section 19(3) CTA 2009). For the purpose of capital gains, the requirement of 
a UK situs could have been retained in Section 10B TCGA 1992. 
 
(3) Credit Rating 
Pursuant to Section 21(2)(a) CTA 2009 the PE has the same credit rating as the non-UK resident 
company of which it is part has as a whole. This assumption is a concession to the legal character of 
the PE not being a legal entity and stands in tension with the separate enterprise hypothesis. 
However, the PE factually raises its credits at the interest rate applicable to the company, which is 
generally below the costs an independent enterprise of the size of the PE would have to bear.81 In 
accordance with this attribute explicitly stipulated by domestic law, intra-entity guarantees in 
respect to borrowings and payments on such guarantees are disregarded.82 Although this may not be 
a very consistent concept, it complies with the OECD’s approach that was already mentioned in the 
2001 Discussion Draft.83 
 
(4) Equity and Loan Capital 
Furthermore, Section 21(2)(b) CTA 2009 requires the PE to have (for tax purposes) “such equity 
and loan capital as it could reasonably be expected to have” if it were a separate and distinct 
enterprise.  
                                                
80 Senior’s reasoning in the branch report seems to support this argument; see Senior, [2006] IFA-UK 665 at 670. 
81 INTM267130. 
82 INTM267130.  
83 OECD, 2001 Discussion Draft, para. 164.  
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(a) The Case Law 
The landmark cases in respect to capital allocation are the decisions in the US NatWest cases 
(specifically the first two), in which NatWest (a UK bank) operated through branches in the States. 
In NatWest I, the US Court of Federal Claims found the formulary apportionment of interest 
expenses provided in US domestic law to be contrary to the equivalent of Article 7 OECD MTC in 
the UK-US treaty whereas it held that the deductible interest might be adjusted by allocating an 
“adequate capital to the branch”.84 In NatWest II the US Court stated that the separate enterprise 
principle does not imply that the US branch has to fulfil the capital requirements imposed on actual 
legal entities incorporated under US law.85 As a result, the NatWest cases basically reject both 
approaches to allocation of capital the OECD now recommends. However, NatWest II approved the 
former UK approach (as applied after 1978)86 to the allocation of free working capital to branches 
of banks,87 pursuant to which the Revenue regarded that amount as interest-free capital that 
followed from the branch’s books subject to (rather limited) adjustments that reflected the amount 
needed to fund identifiable capital expenses.88  
 
(b) The Preferred Approach: The Thin Capitalisation Method 
While the former concept was only relevant for the banking industry, Section 21(2)(b) CTA 2009 
also covers non-financial businesses of non-resident companies operating in the UK through PEs. 
As the amount of capital has to equate to the amount a separate enterprise would have, the 
legislation is evidently in favour of what the OECD calls the “thin capitalisation method”.89 
Pursuant to the OECD Report(s), this approach requires the PE’s capital to be calculated on an 
arm’s length basis taking into account the assets used and risks assumed.90 In a non-banking 
environment, the OECD foregoes the inclusion of risks since there are usually only insufficient 
instruments to identify and measure them.91 Accordingly, HMRC bases its interpretation of the 
“thin capitalisation method” under domestic law (as to PEs in general) only on the attributable 
assets.  
                                                
84 National Westminster Bank PLC v United States (NatWest I), [1999] 1 ITLR 725 at 743. 
85 National Westminster Bank PLC v United States (NatWest II), [2003] 6 ITLR 292; both decisions were confirmed in 
NatWest IV, see National Westminster Bank PLC v United States, [2008] 10 ITLR 423. 
86 Before 1978 the UK applied the PW Formula (“Price Waterhouse formula”), which allocated a portion of the bank’s 
total free capital to the PE based on the ratio of the PEs liabilities to the bank’s worldwide liabilities. However, the 
approach was abandoned after it was opined that it was contrary to the separate  
enterprise hypothesis as it did not take account of the actual conditions under which branches operated,  
see Birla, [2005] BTR 207 at 214. 
87 NatWest II (loc. cit.) at 317. 
88 INTM267702. 
89 See INTM267120. 
90 OECD, PE Report 2008, Part I, para. 163. 
91 OECD, PE Report 2008, Part I, para. 143. 
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It sets out a four-step procedure that basically implies the drawing of a (notional) balance sheet 
(which must not necessarily equal the PE’s existing accounts since it serves the mere purpose of 
calculating the free capital).92 Tangible and intangible assets (disregarding any revaluations above 
or below cost) are to be included in these sheets (i.e. attributed to the PE) if it “derives profits” from 
them (vide supra). In a second step, it is determined how much equity and how much interest-
bearing debt has to be assumed in respect to those assets.93 This step is based on “thin capitalisation 
principles using an independent banker approach”. Furthermore, the capital structure of the non-
resident company as a whole and of other UK companies that are comparable is considered. Under 
the third step, the funding costs (i.e. interest and borrowing costs) payable on the amount qualifying 
as debt capital in accordance with Step 2 are determined. In a fourth step, the PE’s claimed funding 
costs are adjusted (if differing from the costs calculated under Step 3).  
 
As pointed out above, the legislation expresses a strong preference for the thin capitalisation 
method. Thus, HMRC opines that it may only be possible to use the capital allocation method 
(which applies the capital ratio of the company to the PE) in cases where the activities of the PE and 
the company are sufficiently equal.94 For the most part, this concept is in accordance with the 
OECD’s opinion, which (particularly under pressure from the UK) neither recommends a single 
approach to the allotment of capital nor states that all approaches being authorised in the PE Report 
must be accepted domestically.95 However, this domestic concept carries some practical difficulties 
(vide infra).  
 
(c) The Practical Implications 
The capital attribution rules are specifically (but not explicitly) relevant for the banking sector. In 
this respect, the assets of the bank must be risk-weighted in accordance with the FSA regulatory 
regime.96 However, under the thin capitalisation approach (vide supra), the capital of the PE does 
not equal the amount a separate and distinct enterprise would be required to have under the 
regulations since it is assumed that UK companies would usually have some capital in excess of 
that amount.97 Furthermore, whereas the OECD suggests applying the regulatory approach as safe 
harbour, the UK explicitly refused such a concept,98 which is why it is necessary to actually find 
                                                
92 INTM267130. 
93 In respect to the allocation of the interest expenses this basically implements the tracing approach, see OECD, PE 
Report 2008, Part I, para. 186. 
94 INTM267140. 
95 OECD, PE Report 2008, Part I, para. 124. 
96 INTM 277712. 
97 INTM267701. 
98 See INTM267783.  
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comparables. However, it is submitted that this task is extremely difficult since basically only the 
large UK incorporated banks publish their regulatory ratios, which are (in essence) not comparable 
to the operations of PEs, which will usually be much smaller.99 Furthermore, it is observed that 
HRMC tends to simply apply the average ratio of 12% (9% Tier 1 and 3% Tier 2).100 Therefore, it 
seems that the thin capitalisation approach is not workable in practice. Moreover, the method can 
lead to a result where the summed up amount of free capital (considering all parts of the company) 
is higher than the equity the company (as such) actually has. Therefore, the new legislation on 
attributing profits to PEs with respect to relief by credit or exemption provides that account has to 
be taken of the rest of the company (see Section 43(4) TIOPA 2010).101 This effectively leads to an 
implementation of the capital allocation (rather than the thin capitalisation) method. It is incoherent 
that the domestic legislation as to the attribution of capital for PEs situated in the UK does not 
equally support such an approach (but only under the restrictions set out above).  
 
bb. Calculating the Profit of the Simulated Enterprise 
Hypothesising the PE as a separate and distinct enterprise with its own functions, assets and risks is 
the basis for the allocation of actual transactions and the recognition of intra-entity dealings 
(internal transactions; vide supra).  
 
The attributable profit made from actual transactions can usually be directly inferred from the 
agreements between the parties. This is only with the exception of transaction between related 
persons, which are subject to adjustments under the transfer pricing legislation.102 In the context of 
the OECD MTC, this gave rise to the question of whether the former Article 7 allowed adjustments 
to the profits of the PE that were made from transactions with related parties (this is to be 
distinguished from the adjustments under Article 9 in respect to the enterprise as such), which is 
why the US used to include a specific provision to ensure this possibility.103 The issue seems to be 
the same under domestic law since Section 22 CTA 2009 only stipulates that “transactions between 
the permanent establishment and any other part of the non-UK resident company” are to be treated 
as taking place at arm’s length. However, as Hemmelrath persuasively argued in respect to Article 
7, the possibility of adjustments was always inherent in the separate enterprise hypothesis,104 which 
is an argument that can be similarly used for the UK’s domestic legislation. Therefore, the amounts 
attributable to the PE from transactions with related entities must also be at arm’s length. As 
                                                
99 See Long/Hails, [2005] 787 Tax Journal 9.  
100 See Long/Hails, [2005] 787 Tax Journal 9. 
101 Bell, [2011] BTR 425 at 427. 
102 Sections 146 TIOPA 2010 et seqq. 
103 See Hemmelrath, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Article 7 para. 7. 
104 See Hemmelrath, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Article 7 para. 94. 
 21 
mentioned above, the same applies to intra-entity dealings, which must be generally recognized 
(Section 22 CTA 2009).  
 
The demanded application of the arm’s length standard requires the use of transfer pricing 
techniques. However, the domestic legislation on transfer pricing is only legally applicable to 
transactions between related parties. Hence, transfer pricing principles only come within the scope 
of Sections 21 and 22 CTA 2009 by way of interpretation. 105 This could lead to the question of 
whether only the domestic provisions or also the TPGL should be used for interpretation and which 
one should prevail. However, because of the explicit reference to the latter made by the domestic 
rules, differences are unlikely to arise.106 Accordingly, transfer prices (including a profit mark-up) 
are to be determined in accordance with the general methodology, which includes the application of 
the traditional methods as well as the profit methods.107  
 
As to intra-entity dealings, CTA 2009 provides some exceptions to the general directive of 
recognizing and valuing them at arm’s length. These are set out in the following paragraphs that 
endeavour to give an overview on the treatment of selected internal transactions.   
 
(1) Provision of Goods and Services 
Section 23 CTA 2009 provides that the supply of goods and services to the PE shall only be treated 
as an intra-entity dealing “if the goods and services are of a kind that the company supplies, in the 
ordinary course of its business, to third parties dealing with it at arm’s length.” If this is not the 
case, the issue is dealt with as an expense, which means that the costs of the goods and services are 
attributable to the PE if they were incurred for its purposes (vide infra). This is largely consistent 
with the 2008 OECD Commentary.108 
 
Although the wording of Section 23 CTA 2009 does only refer to situations where services and 
goods are transferred to the UK PE, it was persuasively argued that the same principles are 
applicable (as a matter of interpreting the general rule in Section 22 CTA 2009 in a consistent way) 
in respect to situations where the UK PE transfers goods and services to other parts of the company 
(with the consequence that the UK can only include a mark-up in the tax base when the goods and 
services are of the kind mentioned above).109 This also implies, that the UK cannot impose any 
                                                
105 INTM267040. 
106 See section 164 TIOPA 2010. 
107 See the examples in INTM267050 et seqq. 
108 See OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 31 and 35. A slight difference can arise concerning goods, for which the 
Commentary (also) refers to the purpose of the particular supply, see OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 33. 
109 See Senior, [2006] IFA-UK 665 at 674; similarly Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 368. 
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mark-ups merely because the main activity of the PE is the provision of services to the enterprise to 
which it belongs, providing a real benefit to the latter. The Commentary, however, opines for an 
arm’s length remuneration for these so-called “specific services”.110 
 
(2) Internal Transfer of Capital Assets and Intangibles 
As regards the transfer of capital assets from UK PEs to overseas head offices, Section 25(1) TCGA 
1992 explicitly states that there is a deemed market value disposal and reacquisition when the 
respective asset ceases to be a chargeable asset.111 This is the case when the asset is no longer 
attributable to the PE in accordance with the principles stipulated in Section 19(3)(c) CTA 2009 
(vide supra). Furthermore, for the purpose of capital allowances, equipment is treated as being 
disposed of either at market value or at the original cost (if the latter is lower), which effectuates a 
recapture of the difference between the respective value and the written-down value (see sections 
61 and 62 CAA 2001 in conjunction with the separate enterprise hypothesis).112 Accordingly, a 
transfer from an overseas head office to a UK PE is to be treated as an acquisition at the lower of 
the market value or the original costs pursuant to Section 13 CAA 2001.113  
 
The 2008 OECD Commentary basically does not deal with the category of capital assets as such.114 
It only indicates that a mere temporary transfer of machinery is not assumed to constitute a dealing 
(i.e. only an allocation of costs is permissible).115 However, from this statement it can be inferred 
that the general position is that all permanent transfers should be remunerated at arm’s length 
(argumentum e contrario). 116  The UK’s domestic provisions are in accordance with the 
Commentary interpreted that way.  
 
As regards intangibles, Section 859(2)(b) CTA 2009 stipulates that the internal transfer from the 
UK PE to the overseas head office is to be treated as a deemed market value disposal and 
reacquisition for the purposes of corporation tax.117 On the other hand, if an asset begins “to be held 
for the purposes of a trade carried on by the company in the United Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment” the asset is treated as acquired at its net book value (see Section 863 CTA 2009).118 
                                                
110 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 36. 
111 Bramwell, Taxation of Companies, para. P1.1.9. 
112 Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 368. 
113 Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 369. 
114 See Russo, [2004] BIFD 472 at 478; Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, at 164. 
115 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 33; 
116 Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, at 164 
117 CIRD10200. 
118 CIRD10200; Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 369. 
 23 
The 2008 OECD Commentary rather seems to reject such taxation since it assumes an (exclusive) 
allocation of intangibles to be practically impossible.119 
 
(3) Interest and Royalties 
Sections 31(1) CTA 2009 denies the recognition of internal royalties or similar payments made for 
the use of intangible assets by the PE. However, Section 32(2) explicitly states that this “does not 
prevent a deduction for any contribution by the permanent establishment to the costs of creation of 
an intangible asset”. Although the legislation only covers the case of payments made by the PE to 
the overseas head office, the same should apply as a matter of consistency to payments made by the 
head office to the UK PE,120 which can be effectuated by an according interpretation of Section 22 
CTA 2009. This is largely consistent with the 2008 OECD Commentary.121 
 
Section 32(2) CTA 2009 states that internal interest payments and other financing costs made by the 
PE are not deductible (i.e. are not recognized as an internal transaction) unless they are paid “in the 
ordinary course of a financial business carried on” by the PE. As in the context of royalties, this 
prohibition should also apply the other way around by construing Section 22 CTA 2009 
accordingly. Section 32 CTA 2009 also complies with the 2008 Commentary.  
 
(4) Other Dealings 
Furthermore, internal dealings on loans in order to guarantee the creditworthiness of another part of 
the company are not accepted due to the assumption of Section 21(1)(a) CTA 2009 that both have 
the same credit rating (vide supra).122 Besides, no explicit prohibition of intra-entity dealings is 
prescribed in the legislation. Therefore, the separate enterprise principle will apply to those 
dealings, which means that a transfer price (including a profit mark-up) has to be determined.  
 
(5) Deductible Expenses 
Although some internal transactions are disregarded, the actual costs the enterprise suffered are 
generally deductible for the PE to the extent they were incurred for its purposes and a deduction 
would be permissible if the PE was a company (see Section 29 CTA 2009). In that regard it does 
not matter where the expenses arose or whether or not they were reimbursed by the PE. The section 
makes it clear that this approach also applies to executive and management expenses. However, 
with regard to the deductibility of interest expenses, the limit imposed by the attribution of interest-
                                                
119 See OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 34. 
120 See Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 370. 
121 See OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 34. 
122 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 41 et seqq. 
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free capital has to be taken into account (see Section 30 CTA 2009), which means that the 
deduction, even of actual interest, is denied to the extent to which the underlying loan is treated as 
part of the PE’s equity (see the explanations above for the calculation). The rules largely reflect the 
opinion of the OECD in the 2008 Commentary, in which (in the course of the 2008 update) also 
explicit recommendations on capital attribution were included.123  
 
(6) Conclusion 
The recognition of internal dealings under UK law and the regime as regards expenses is for the 
most part in compliance with the OECD Model 2008. The difficulties as to the (internal) transfer of 
intangibles are illustrated above. The UK did not implement the “specific services” concept, the 
OECD uses in its Commentary. However, practically, the latter point will not be of huge 
significance. Unfortunately, the UK rules are drafted in a very one-sided manner since they 
(according to their wording) only prohibit deductions to be made at arm’s length but do not 
explicitly deal with the taxation of, for example, internal services provided by the PE to other parts 
of the company. Although a consistent result can be deduced on the basis of a restrictive 
interpretation of the separate enterprise principle in Section 22, this way of drafting is not very 
persuasive.124  
 
f. The Current State of Play 
The UK’s domestic rules on attribution of profits to PEs of non-UK resident companies (including 
the concept of PE as such) seem to be “somehow in between”. On the one hand, they are largely 
based on the OECD’s concept prior to 2010. However, this also implies that some of the 
inconsistencies that were already included in the OECD Model are transferred to the level of 
domestic law. This specifically concerns the lists in Section 1141(2) and 1143(3) CTA 2010 and the 
restrictions that apply on the separate enterprise thinking. Similar to the OECD’s approach, UK 
domestic law supports neither a full FSEA nor a full RBAA but applies a mixture of both. In 
particular, it is conceptually questionable to allow the exclusive allocation of intangibles for the 
purpose of taxing their cross-border transfer within the single entity but deny the deduction of 
royalties at arm’s length. On the other hand, the OECD’s concept is not implemented word for 
word, which is largely to the advantage, but to some extent also to the disadvantage, of 
comprehensibility and consistency. The rule in Section 22 CTA 2009, which explicitly states that 
internal transactions shall be recognized, renders the situation as to the degree of independence that 
the PE is assumed to have under domestic law much clearer than does the old version of Article 7 
                                                
123 OECD-Comm. 2008, Article 7 para. 45 et seqq.  
124 Similarly Petriccione, in: Attribution of Profits, at 369. 
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OECD MTC does for the purpose of treaties, which is why it substantially increases legal certainty. 
However, the concept of attributing assets is drafted in a far more complex way than necessary. 
Additionally, the wording of the restrictions as to the recognition of dealings does rather 
compromise the comprehensibility of the UK’s concept.  
 
Moreover, the inner consistency of UK law is also affected by the implementation of the new 
concept as regards the allocation of profits to PEs of UK resident companies for the purpose of 
relief under TIOPA 2010. While the former approach for calculating the credit referred to the rules 
discussed in this paper, new Section 43 TIOPA 2010 incorporates a system that is basically separate 
from Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009. The new regime is essentially based on the OECD Model 2010 
and does not contain the restrictions on dealings that are applicable in respect to the inbound 
situation (non-UK resident company trading in the UK).125 It also provides support for the capital 
allocation method for computing the amount of equity the PE is deemed to have for tax purposes, 
which is (from a practical point of view) easier and in many cases more reliable than the thin 
capitalisation method, which largely depends on the accessibility of comparables.  
 
Further complications arise when treaties are applicable (especially when they are based on the 
OECD Model 2010). The following paragraphs endeavour to illustrate the respective issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
125 Additionally, Section 18A(6)(b) and (7)(b) CTA 2009 determine that (in a first step), for the purpose of attributing 
profits/losses for calculating the amount under the exemption regime, the 2010 Model is assumed to be applicable for 
non-full treaty territories.   
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III. The Impact of Double Tax Conventions 
1. The Status of Tax Treaties under UK Domestic Law 
a. Incorporation 
The outcome reached by applying domestic rules and principles is generally subject to the 
provisions of double tax conventions. Since the UK considers national and international law as 
being separate from each other (dualist theory), DTCs only influence the legal position of taxpayers 
to the extent an incorporation or transformation into domestic law has occurred (although the 
agreement is binding on the state as subject of international law from the moment of ratification).126 
As a matter of simplification, tax treaties are usually implemented by means of delegated 
legislation.127 Section 2 TIOPA 2010 states that a DTC on income, corporation and capital gains tax 
(inter alia) has effect pursuant to Section 6 TIPOA 2010 if Her Majesty issues an Order in Council 
(after a draft of the Order has been approved by the House of Commons in accordance with Section 
5 TIOPA 2010) declaring that a DTC has been made “with a view to affording relief from double 
taxation” and “that it is expedient that those arrangements should have effect.”128 Section 6(2) 
TIOPA 2010 provides an exhaustive list that determines in which regard(s) effect is given to DTCs 
to which such an Order in Council refers. This is (inter alia) the case  
 
“(e) for determining the income or chargeable gains to be attributed to agencies, branches or 
establishments in the United Kingdom of non-UK resident persons […]” 
 
Section 6(1) TIOPA 2010 stipulates that the effect conceded by these provisions is given “despite 
anything in any enactment”. Hence, to the extent the PE definitions and rules on profit attribution 
embedded in UK DTCs are narrower than the domestic provisions set out above, they restrict the 
taxing rights that would arise in accordance with the latter.129 Although in dualist systems the 
(incorporated) treaty rules are subject to potential treaty overrides by domestic law, this is of no 
particular relevance in the current context since it would require (at least from the UK perspective) 
a clear intention of the legislator to render the respective treaty provisions inapplicable, which was 
obviously not the purpose of the implementation of the domestic PE definition and the attribution 
system in 2003.130 
                                                
126 See Harris/Oliver, International Commercial Tax, p. 21.  
127 Baker, DTC, Introductory Topics, para. F.03. 
128 Technically, Section 2 et seqq. TIOPA 2010 do not confer the power on Her Majesty to issue an “Order in Council”, 
which can rather be made in exercise of the royal prerogative, but impose certain conditions and procedures that must 
be adhered to in order to trigger the effect specified in Section 6 TIPOA 2010 (i.e. an Order would be valid even 
without the approval prescribed in Article 5 TIOPA 2010 but not effective pursuant to Section 6 TIOPA 2010), see 
Roxan, in: Maisto, Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, p. 318 et seq.  
129 See Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 19. 
130 See for the requirement of a “clear intention of the legislator to override the treaty” Miller/Oats, International 
Taxation, para. 7.4. with further references.   
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b. Can Double Tax Conventions Impose or Increase Taxation? 
The question that arises in respect to the attribution of profits to PEs is rather whether or not treaties 
can impose taxes by virtue of a treaty notion of PE that is wider than the one in Section 1141 et 
seqq. CTA 2010 (i.e. impose taxes where domestic law does not provide for taxation) or whether or 
not they can increase an existing domestic tax liability on the grounds of treaty principles on profit 
allocation that differ from those in Section 19 et seqq. CTA 2009.  
 
On an international level, the matter is controversial. While the Hoge Raad in the Netherlands 
tended to assume that treaties might also work to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, the prevailing 
opinion in most countries seems to be that they cannot impose taxes or increase an existing tax 
liability.131 However, the question cannot be answered universally but depends first and foremost on 
the domestic law of the state at issue. DTCs have the purpose of avoiding double taxation that could 
arise when states would exercise their jurisdiction to tax that they have by virtue of their 
sovereignty.132 They do not confer taxing rights upon the Contracting States but seek to impose 
limits on the possibility of exercising the national tax jurisdiction.133 Accordingly, they are (as such) 
not designed to provide a legislative basis for imposing or increasing taxation, which is why 
(separate) domestic rules are required that clearly specify whether and to which extent taxes are 
levied. However, this does not prevent the national legislator from including provisions that 
automatically extend taxation to the limits defined in a country’s DTCs.134 
 
At first glance, it appears arguable that Section 6(2)(e) TIOPA 2010 replaces the domestic rules on 
attribution of profits to permanent establishments with the respective treaty rules for the purpose of 
determining the basis for corporation tax.135 Indeed, the Revenue tried to apply a similar reasoning 
to transfer pricing, for which it referred to what is now Section 6(2)(f) TIOPA 2010, so as to render 
the equivalents of Article 9 OECD MTC of the UK’s DTCs directly applicable for adjusting the 
taxable income of associated enterprises since the treaty rules appeared to go further than the 
domestic provisions.136 Although the approach found some approval in literature due to the wording 
“double tax agreements have effect […] for determining the income” (see Section 6(2)(f) TIOPA  
 
 
                                                
131 See Baker, DTC, Introductory Topics, para. B.02 et seqq. with references to the decisions of the Hooge Raad.  
132 See Vogel, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Introduction, para. 71. This does not precludes that DTCs also aim at preventing 
fiscal evasion, see OECD-Comm. 2008, para. 16; Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 4. 
133 Vogel, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, Introduction, para. 71. 
134 See Baker, DTC, Introductory Topics, para. B.05.  
135 A similar effect could be assumed in respect to Section 6(2)(b), see Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 15.  
136 See Hohlfeld, DBA, p. 66. 
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2010),137 the Revenue eventually dropped this reasoning when cases concerning the issue were 
likely to reach the courts.138 This is persuasive taking into account the words “with a view to 
affording relief from double taxation” in Section 2(1) TIOPA 2010, which clearly expresses the 
(limited) impact and relevance of treaties for the purposes of UK law. Accordingly, the legislation 
does not confer the power to impose or increase taxes by implementing DTCs.139 Contrarily, taxes 
may only be imposed by the issuance of an explicit domestic provision by Parliament.140 This result 
does not conflict with the decision in Union Texas Petroleum Corporation v Critchley, where the 
court found a treaty rule that provided for a 5% deduction on a tax credit on dividends to be 
permissible. Economically, the charge represented (a part of) the domestic income tax, which is 
why the treaty as such did not impose a tax.141 
 
c. Conclusion 
Tax treaties (or, more precisely, implemented or transformed tax treaties) impose limits to domestic 
taxation, which the taxpayer can invoke to mitigate his tax burden and which (generally) prevail 
over domestic provisions. On the other hand, DTCs do not (at least in the UK) provide a basis for 
imposing or increasing taxes. However, this leads to an asymmetric effect, which specifically 
becomes apparent in case of treaties based on Article 7 of the OECD Model 2010 (vide infra).  
 
2. The Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
Before turning to these aspects, it shall be briefly illustrated which status the OECD Commentary 
has for interpreting treaties that are based on the Model, since most parts of the OECD’s concepts 
are explained in this document rather than being explicitly formulated in the Model. Referring to 
IRC v Commerzbank142 and Memec,143 the Commentary is often assessed as supplementary material 
within Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.144 However, in the Smallwood case, the Special 
Commissioners conceded a more elevated status to it by considering the document 
as establishing the special meaning within Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention.145 This is 
persuasive since treaty negotiations that are based on the wording of the OECD Model usually  
 
 
                                                
137 Oliver, [1970] BTR 345 at 398. 
138 Oliver, [1998] BTR 1 et seqq.  
139 Equally Oliver, [1998] BTR 1 at 2. 
140 See Baker, DTC, para. B.05. 
141 Similarly Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 16. 
142 See IRC v Commerzbank, [1996] STC 285 at 298.  
143 Memec plc v Commissioners of Inland Revenues, [1996] TC 77 at 93. 
144 See Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 74.  
145 Smallwood v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, [2008] STC (SCD) 629 at 651. 
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take account of the interpretation of that wording given to it by the OECD.146 However, in  
Commerzbank it has also been made clear that subsequent Commentaries (i.e. versions of the 
Commentary the OECD published after the treaty at issue was concluded) only have persuasive 
value.147 Obviously, new explanations cannot form part of a historical approach to interpretation 
(and, therefore, cannot be regarded as being part of the “special meaning” the negotiators wanted to 
give to the wording of the Model). Furthermore, such amendments of the Commentary do not fall 
within Article 31(3)(a) Vienna Convention, which requires a contractual agreement.148 Article 
31(3)(b) of the Convention demands (at least) a considerable time of subsequent practice, which 
must suffice to constitute an opinio juris (i.e. a settled opinion of courts and administration).149 
Hence, the Commentary that was in force when the treaty was concluded has to be taken into 
account as being the “special meaning” of the words used in the treaty while subsequent 
Commentaries only have persuasive value.  
 
3. Treaties Based on the Old OECD Approach 
Since the 2008 Commentary and domestic law are largely consistent, treaties concluded after 2008 
on the old version of the Model will usually not give rise to any particular deviations of treaty law 
from UK domestic law (vide supra). However, some more issues may arise where treaties were 
negotiated on the basis of older Commentaries. Although the OECD regards the amendments made 
to the document in 2008 as being of purely clarifying nature that does not entail any “true” 
differences to the prior version, the 2008 Commentary obviously contains concepts that were not 
applicable before.150 This specifically becomes apparent as to the attribution of capital, for which 
now the application of the capital allocation or thin capitalisation method is prescribed, which was 
not the case before. Indeed, both methods were rejected on the grounds of the separate enterprise 
principle in NatWest. To the extent, that courts construe older treaties to be based on such a rather 
narrow conception of independence, those treaties will override the domestic provisions (e.g. 
disregard the domestic concept of capital attribution). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
146 See Schwarz, Tax Treaties, p. 74.  
147 See IRC v Commerzbank, [1996] STC 285 at 298. 
148 See in detail Lang, [2011] IWB 281 at 282. 
149 Lang, [2011] IWB 281 at 284. 
150 See for a comprehensive comparison Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, p. 245 et seqq. 
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4. The 2010 Model 
With the 2010 Model, the OECD took the next step in implementing the AOA and amended Article 
7 OECD MTC as well as the Commentary and the Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, to which the Commentary extensively refers for the purpose of interpreting the new 
business profits article. While the OECD considered the wording of Article 7 OECD MTC 2008 to  
be wedded to its opinion expressed in the Commentary prior to 2010 and, thus, held the Article to 
be unsuitable for applying the FSEA to its full extent, the new version provides the required basis 
for the new thinking. Therefore, the limitations in respect to the degree of hypothesised 
independence of the PE that were acknowledged under the 2008 cluster (due to the fact that the PE 
is only part of a single enterprise and not a legal entity itself) are repudiated under the 2010 
approach.  
 
a. The PE Concept 
The wording of Article 5 OECD MTC did not change with the 2010 update. Furthermore, the 
OECD made it clear that the AOA does not entail any changes to the PE concept as such.151 
Therefore, the conclusions in respect to the compliance of the UK’s domestic rules on the notion of 
PE with the OECD’s 2008 cluster are equally valid in respect to the 2010 Model (vide supra). 
 
b. Hypothesising the Separate Enterprise 
The starting point for attributing profits to PEs is the same as under the 2008 cluster – the PE must 
be simulated as a separate and independent enterprise (formerly “distinct and separate”) which 
performs its own functions, bears its own risks, (economically) possesses its own assets and has its 
own capital (i.e. “equity”).152 Since this idea was already (partly) embedded in the “old” OECD 
thinking that was adopted by the UK, the dogmatic and theoretical framework of the domestic rules 
is (to basically the same extent to which the 2008 Commentary complies with the 2010 Model) in 
accordance with the 2010 cluster. The 2010 concept also brings along a consistent concept on the 
allocation of intangibles. In general terms, the attribution is made subject to the significant people 
functions (the SPF concept is basically already applied in UK law; vide supra) that assume the 
underlying risks of the intangible assets. For tangibles on the other hand, the “place of use” is 
usually the decisive criterion. As regards free capital, the OECD recommends (as it did in the 2008 
Commentary) the application of a thin capitalisation or a capital allocation approach (further 
methods are discussed for banking businesses).153 
                                                
151 See e.g. OECD, PE Report 2010, Preface, para. 9. 
152 The change in the wording from “distinct and separate” under the 2008 Model to “separate and independent” appears 
to be an attempt to highlight that the FSEA should be applicable.  
153 OECD, PE Report 2010, Part II, para. 85 et seqq. 
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c. Calculating the Profit of the Hypothesised Enterprise 
As under the 2008 Model, the profits of the permanent establishment consist of its transactions with 
related and unrelated companies and its dealings with other parts of the company. Under the OECD 
MTC 2010, generally all internal dealings must be recognized and valued at arm’s length to the 
extent they are based on an identifiable economical event.  
 
Accordingly, the restrictions as to the provision of service and goods that were contained in the 
2008 Model (vide supra) are no longer applicable (i.e. it has no longer to be determined whether or 
not the goods or services relate to the ordinary course of the company’s business).154 The arm’s 
length principle also applies to the provision of executive and general administrative services (e.g. 
accounting), transfers of assets (whether tangible or intangible) and internal royalties.155 With 
regard to intra-entity interest payments, the OECD is still reluctant (basically because of the 
possibilities of abuse).156 However, even these payments are acknowledged when the “loans” are 
provided by a part of the company that performs a real treasury function (i.e. it must not only 
occasionally equip the other parts of the company with money but must be generally responsible for 
raising and providing credit).157  
 
Since the UK’s domestic position complies for the most part with the 2008 Commentary, these 
amendments at the OECD level have created a situation where UK domestic law is in conflict with 
the OECD’s approach. Specifically, the restrictions contained in Sections 23, 29, 31 and 32 CTA 
2009 (vide supra) are not in accordance with the recent concept. As to the transfer of tangible 
assets, no significant differences arise while the domestic position in respect to intangibles appears 
to be broader than the OECD’s (specifically because of the application of the “place of use” test 
under UK law; vide supra).  
 
d. The Implications of Treaties Based on the OECD MTC 2010  
On the one hand, the current provisions contained in Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009 extend the 
scope of taxation that would arise on the basis of an unlimited application of the separate enterprise 
principle by stipulating that certain categories of internal transactions are to be disregarded and do 
not give rise to a deduction. Instead, only a share of the actual costs the enterprise has incurred as a 
whole is allocated to the PE (vide supra). This specifically relates to royalties, interest and the 
provision of goods and services (including administrative and management services). Since the 
                                                
154 See Bobbet/Avery Jones, [2010] BIT 20 et seqq. 
155 See Reimer, in: Reimer, PE, OECD MTC, para. 131 et seqq. 
156 Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, p. 209. 
157 Plansky, Gewinnzurechnung, p. 209. 
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OECD Model 2010 determines that even these dealings must be generally recognized, this 
extension of the domestic tax base would not be in accordance with the business profits articles in 
actual treaties based on the new MTC.158 Pursuant to Section 6(1) TIOPA 2010, DTCs have effect 
“despite anything in any enactment”, which is why implemented treaties generally impose limits to 
the taxing rights exercised by domestic law. Consequently, the DTC would override the domestic 
provisions and the UK would need to grant deductions for the above-mentioned dealings at arm’s 
length.  
 
On the other hand, domestic law also ignores dealings for the purpose of taxing profits that would 
potentially arise from such intra-entity transactions under the separate enterprise principle of the 
2010 Model. Accordingly, (inter alia) internal royalty payments or service fees received by the PE 
are not taxable domestically. Furthermore, as set out above, treaties can neither impose nor increase 
taxation. Section 6(2)(e) TIOPA 2010 (in conjunction with the respective DTC) does not provide a 
basis for exercising taxing rights, which can only be done through explicit domestic rules. In other 
words, the additional taxing rights that the OECD MTC 2010 leaves to the UK (compared to the 
2008 Model) are currently not effectuated. 
 
Without an according amendment of domestic law, this asymmetric result (deduction for dealings in 
respect to which the PE is (economically) the payer but no taxation on amounts received by the PE 
as supplier) has the potential to result in a substantial decrease in Revenue. Other countries have 
similar issues in respect to the new OECD Model and have started revising their domestic provision 
in order to give effect to the additional rights before enacting treaties on the basis of the 2010 
Model.159  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
158 The Commentary makes it clear that the general recognition of dealings (including the refusal to grant a deduction 
because of their nature as intra-entity transactions) is (also) a matter of Article 7 rather than (only) of Article 24(3) 
OECD MTC 2010 (see OECD-Comm. 2010, Article 7, para. 31). Therefore, the (contentious) extent to which the non-
discrimination article is incorporated in UK law is of no particular relevance in the present context. See generally, in 
respect to the incorporation of Article 24(3) OECD MTC 2010, Avery Jones, in: Maisto, Tax Treaties and Domestic 
Law, Ch. 6, p. 135 and Baker, DTC, Article 24, para. 24B.26 with further references to the relevant case law. 
159 See e.g. Section 1 AStG as proposed by the German government in its draft for the Annual Tax Act 2013 
(http://www. 
bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Gesetzestexte/Gesetzentwuerfe_Arbeitsfassungen/2012-05-23-
jahressteuergesetz-2013.html).  
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5. Proposed Amendment  
However, it should be noted that all UK treaties currently in force are based on the 2008 Model.160 
Only the new DTCs with Barbados (signed on 26 April 2012) and Liechtenstein (signed on 11 June 
2012) are based on the new version of Article 7 OECD MTC. However, neither treaty has so far 
been incorporated. Therefore, a revision of the domestic rules seems not to be too urgent at the 
moment. Furthermore, the clash of domestic provisions based on the assumptions in the 2010 
Model and a treaty based on the 2008 version could also result in contradictions. The taxing rights 
as to intra-entity royalties, interest and services (inter alia) that domestic law would endeavour to 
exercise would be restricted by the only limited independence of the PE assumed in the 2008 MTC. 
On the other hand, the domestic provisions would also give deductions for the mentioned dealings 
at arm’s length, which would not be required under a treaty based on the old Model. Furthermore, 
domestic law could not restrict this grant by referring to the treaty since this would also result in the 
DTC increasing the tax burden.161 Again, the result would be an asymmetric effect that could 
compromise the amount of revenue.  
 
Accordingly, a domestic provision that endeavours to bring about a consistent outcome under the 
2010 as well as under the 2008 Model has to be drafted two-pronged. While maintaining the general 
rules currently contained in Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009, this could be effectuated through the 
implementation of a provision like the following:  
 
(1) To the extent a double tax agreement based on the OECD Model Tax Convention as 
amended in 2010 is applicable,  
(a) the limitations on the recognition and valuation of transaction between the 
permanent establishment and any other part of the non-UK resident company 
stipulated in Section 23, 31 and 32 do not apply and 
(b) this part is to be read in such a manner as best secures consistency to the OECD 
Commentary as amended in 2010 and the Report on the Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments as amended in 2010.  
 
Such a rule would allow exercising the full taxing rights under the 2008 and 2010 Models and could 
also ensure a consistent interpretation of treaty and domestic law to the extent a DTC based on the 
2010 MTC is in force.  
                                                
160 See Baker, [2011] BTR 626 at 626.   
161 The rejection of a deduction equates to the imposition of an additional charge. This is the reason why Vogel even 
considers that the refusal to deduct losses in the context of the exemption method (justified with the principle of 
symmetry) is inadmissible on the grounds that a treaty may not increase taxation, see Vogel, in: Vogel/Lehner, DTC, 
Article 23A/B, para. 48.  
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IV. Conclusion 
The UK’s domestic provisions on the attribution of profits in inbound situations (foreign company 
trading in the UK through a PE) are for the most part in accordance with the former Article 7 
OECD MTC and the Commentary as amended in 2008. At first glance, this is quite surprising, 
taking into account that the UK had already issued its domestic provisions in 2003 while the work 
of the OECD was only finalized with the PE Report in 2008. Specifically the implementation of the 
capital attribution concept and the assumption that all parts of the enterprise have the same credit 
rating are significant anticipations of central aspects of the AOA. On the other hand, it illustrates 
how large the influence was that the UK presumably had on the development of the OECD’s 
concept. 
 
Unfortunately, the implementation of that concept also transferred some of the flaws of the OECD 
approach under the 2008 Model on the level of domestic law. This regards the PE concept as well 
as the attribution rules as such. Although the separate enterprise principle and the general 
recognition of dealings are explicitly prescribed in Chapter 4 of Part 2 CTA 2009, a consistent 
application is (in the same manner as under the OECD Commentary) prevented by the stipulation of 
certain restrictions. However, notwithstanding that this leads to a result that is not conceptually 
consistent, it has the advantage of approximating the outcomes of treaty law and domestic law. This 
basically ensures that the UK can currently exercise all taxing rights it is allowed to exercise under 
its treaties, all of which are based on the old OECD Model. Only two of the DTCs recently 
concluded apply the new version of Article 7 OECD MTC. However, those treaties have not yet 
come into force. Presumably, it will take time for the 2010 concept to become significant in the 
quite large treaty network since it cannot be effectuated without (time-consuming) renegotiations. 
Furthermore, many states are still reluctant to use the new Article (many developing countries 
because they fear an erosion of their source taxing rights, and some developed countries because 
their domestic law is not yet adjusted to the new concept). Therefore, it seems not yet to be 
necessary or advisable to adopt the domestic rules as the principal (and sole) domestic concept.  
 
Nonetheless, if treaties enter into force, which are based on the new thinking, it would be expedient 
to implement an alternative provision that provides for the required taxing rights. Such a rule would 
have to render the restrictions on the separate enterprise thinking under the current provisions 
inapplicable and must provide for an interpretation consistent with the OECD Commentary 2010. A 
respective proposal was made above. This would also have the advantage of increasing the 
consistency with Section 43 TIOPA 2010 (attribution of profits in the outbound situation) that has 
already relinquished the mentioned restrictions. 
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